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4 Individuals and 
Institutions in Social 
Economics 
This chapter will conclude the sampling of topics which are given as 
examples of social economics as a system of theory. As we look at some 
of the micro issues of human psychology which social economics must 
consider, it is worth beginning with the reminder that there is more 
than one body of knowledge which can be drawn upon to aid in an 
economic understanding of human behaviour; e.g., the various 
branches of psychology, as well as existing syntheses especially 
intended for use in the field of economics (cf. the work of George 
Katona, or Amitai Etzioni). As social economics develops there might 
come to be a standard (though, it is to be hoped, always evolving) set of 
understandings in this area 
— but nothing that could be so simply 
summarised as the statement that economic man maximises 
his perceived self-interest'. 
VII Issues of In looking at micro-level behavior we need to 
human remind ourselves that, in fact, neither neoclassical 
psychology economics, nor any other imaginable system of 
theory that would obviously belong in the field of 
economics, is much concerned with tracing the behaviour of any one 
particular individual. The neoclassical system is concerned with 
economic outcomes which are the result of aggregated individual 
behaviours, especially in the intersections of the purchasing behaviours 
and the producing/selling behaviours which create prices. In order for 
the neoclassical system of theory to be (i.e., to make good 
predictions and accurate descriptions of this level of activity), it is not 
necessary for the psychosocial axioms of the system to be realistic, but 
only for the outcomes to be the same as they would be these axioms 
were realistic. 
Often this parsimonious approach yields useful insights. Neoclassical 
economics has developed tools well adapted to model a micro- 
economic picture 
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— in which individual actors are understood to behave atomistically, 
minimising the interaction effects among them; 
— where these individuals may be simplistically understood as 
rationally self-interested, with 'rational behaviour' understood as 
maximising and instrumental; 
— where economic gain may be understood as at least a reasonable 
proxy for most significant motivations, and prices adequately 
reflect the most important and relevant human desires and 
satisfactions; 
— and where all significant actors are willy-nilly competitive. 
However, in part because of what has been lost in this set of 
simplifications, the neoclassical system diminishes in power and 
relevance 
— as the focus shifts from a micro picture of individual interactions to 
a macro picture of societies operating as complex whole organisms; 
— where cooperative behaviours have an economic significance; 
— as we try to understand changes in these organisms over time; 
— as our concern focuses on values other than prices which are used 
in defining some notions of welfare; 
— as we try to relate some real future with the real present (both of 
these being disequilibrium realities); 
— or as we try to make certain necessary translations between reality 
and theory and back again. 
Unfortunately, the neoclassical paradigm contains no way of 
predicting when its insights will be seriously off, or why; and those 
occasions are sometimes of great economic significance. This is why 
there is need for a companion/alternative to the neoclassical paradigm 
which will look inside the black box of human behaviour. 
The psychosocial issues where it seems that the neoclassical model 
runs into trouble include: 
— some areas where motivations other than 'maximisation of self- 
interest' (e.g., altruism, honesty and trust) have important 
economic effects; 
— inframarginal motivations;' 
— the motivations and behaviours that may best be understood in 
terms of the concepts which Alfred Marshall referred to as 
'activities' and 'progress'; 
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— the economic importance of the distinction between needs and 
wants; 
— issues of class, especially in relation to other divisions in human 
society (along lines of race, age, ethnicity, education, etc.); 
— various kinds of power and coercion that arise from or impact 
upon the economic sphere; 
— innovation and entrepreneurial activities; 
— and various information and learning-related issues, including the 
role of advertising, the effects of fashions in thought and belief, 
and the value of collective behaviour for gathering and sharing 
information. 
This chapter will take up only a few of these issues, as examples of 
the social economics approach to understanding human behaviours 
and motivations as determinants, consequences and goals for the field 
of economics. 
VIJA Altruism Most people recognise that there are many altruistic 
motives, including some that have significance for 
economic behaviour. Although this recognition began with Adam 
Smith, and continued to be evident in the writings of most of the 
prominent economists up through the time of Alfred Marshall, it is not 
really compatible with the core of the modern neoclassical paradigm. 
There have been many ingenious efforts to integrate it into the core, 
but none of these have been incorporated into the mainstream. 
The issue may be illustrated by reference to one such effort: Amartya 
Sen's concept of a 'two stage utility function'.2 Sen's proposal was that 
we understand utility-driven choices3 as occurring according to the 
following two steps: first we decide what kind(s) of utility are involved 
in a given problem (e.g., are we after the utility we will feel by doing our 
duty; by that associated with self-improvement; or is it simply 
hedonistic pleasure?) Having made this choice, we then choose the 
activity that will maximise the preferred type of utility. 
As a description of reality, this is probably inferior to a psychology 
of choice which is not constrained to employ the vocabulary and 
concepts ('utility' and 'maximisation') of neoclassical economics. 
However — again, as a description of reality — it is a distinct 
improvement upon the restriction of utility to selfish gain which is 
the most useful definition for the neoclassical core. 
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Selfish gain is not, of course, the only meaning of utility in the 
neoclassical paradigm. However, it has been well argued (see, e.g., 
Chapter 2 in Etzioni, 1988) that attempts to broaden the definition 
further result in either a tautology or a mystery. This has been 
particularly true since the historical time of the transition from classical 
to neoclassical economics. One of the characteristics of that transition 
was an attempt to excise from the field dependence upon beliefs which; 
however widely held, could not be proved. In particular, a number of 
the assumptions of Utilitarianism were formally removed (though their 
presence often remained felt on an informal or unconscious level). One 
consequence of this was the following: 
If interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible, then we are no 
longer able to maximise the sum of utilities across people. So the 
neoclassical utilitarian defends a weaker kind of maximisation 
process in which one maximises his own utility. The classical 
utilitarian's moral principle, which says to maximise the sum of 
utilities, is strong in the sense that it sometimes directs people to act 
against their own selfish interests. The corresponding, weaker 
neoclassical utilitarian's moral principle says that we should move 
toward Pareto optimality. This principle is weaker in not requiring 
individuals to act against their own selfish interests. It is also weaker 
because in many situations it does not tell us what to do.4 
The neoclassicist, with his/her beautifully structured system, suffers 
from a serious problem: 
— all normative inputs have (theoretically) been removed from the 
field; 
— 'you cannot derive ought from is'; 
— yet the economist is constantly in the position of needing to be able 
to say what ought to be done. 
The fall-back upon efficiency is often not enough, for the question 
arises: Efficiency to what end? We shall see throughout this book (and 
even more in Volume 2) instances of where this untenable situation is 
uneasily resolved by the injection of normative elements back into the 
foundations of the field — even into the psychological assumptions, 
from which they are supposed to be absent. The argument over 
altruism, and the appeal to sociobiology to settle it (by proclaiming 
what the nature of Man must be, as a result of evolution) is but one 
symptom of this malaise. 
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VIIB Trust Karl Marx popularised the concept of a callous 'cash 
nexus', or web of commercial relationships, which, he 
claimed, was all that bound people together in a capitalist system. In 
fact, in a variety of ways, modern industrialised economies are more 
than ever dependent upon what might be called 'the trust nexus'. There 
is a web of informal rules, ethical principles, habits and traditions 
which clearly work for the public good and which often do not (at least 
in any obvious way) serve the private, selfish interests of those who 
abide by them. The more complex and interdependent a society 
becomes, with increasing specialisation and rapidly developing 
technology, the more critical these are. 
Social economics could usefully devote some attention to examining 
this issue through such questions as these: 
— What different forms does the 'trust nexus' take? How does it vary 
among different groups of actors (e.g., workers, managers, 
consumers, entrepreneurs, taxpayers, etc.)? 
— Who plays by these rules, and who does not? 
— Under what sorts of circumstances is it most prevalent, where most 
absent? 
— What effect, if any, does social science (including economic) theory 
have upon the trust nexus? 
— How can the trust nexus be encouraged and strengthened? And 
what side effects might result from efforts to do so? 
VIIC Incentives Inframarginal motivations are an important class 
and of motivations which are hard to discern in the 
motivations neoclassical system. Examples include the plea- 
sure which is taken in work in the early hours of 
the day, before fatigue sets in; or a welfare recipient's sense of 
decreased welfare associated with the boredom, and perhaps a feeling 
of reduced value to the world, consequent upon not having work to do. 
There are, additionally, a large set of incentives which do not get 
represented in prices. The use of a person's own time may be an 
example: when I commit my time I also commit my self The other 
'human values' which are then involved ('What will I learn from this 
experience? How will it change me? How will I feel during the hours in 
which I am so engaged?' Etc.) are not easily converted into money 
values. 
Another significant set of motivations which are not normally 
represented in prices is that associated with non-marketed exchanges 
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and non-marketed work, such as volunteer activities. Home-making 
and child-care — activities critical to the wealth and welfare of societies 
— are other outstanding examples. Economists have not neglected these 
areas; where they have dealt with them successfully, however, they have 
generally done so by abandoning much of the core of the neoclassical 
paradigm, stepping, perhaps, into the area to be defined as social 
economics. 
VIID There is an educable aspect to humankind. It 
fads and shows up in such economic places as our ability 
fashions; to adapt to higher petrol prices with energy 
familiarity conservation measures; as well as in the ability of 
and advertisers to manipulate tastes (towards careers 
strangeness in teaching as well as towards the purchase of 
deodorants); not to mention the advertising 
industry's manipulation of the values and self-images of large 
populations. It is, in fact, when tastes, preferences or values change 
that many interesting economic events are likely to occur. This is 
precisely when the light of the neoclassical economic system is apt to 
fail because it takes consumer preferences as 'given' and 'sovereign': in 
assuming that each person is the best judge of what s/he wants, it fails 
to consider what people 'should want to want', or the possibility that 
people might benefit from changing wants through a learning process. 
We may refer here to Alfred Marshall's unabashedly normative 
concept of 'progress'. He assumed that the moral structure which is 
part of the foundation for individual motivations is, or should be, one 
of society's most important ends; the ultimate public good lies in a kind 
of progress wherein human wants are trained so that individuals will 
increasingly want what is good for them.5 What is good for people, 
Marshall felt, is to want the kind of reward which a good person wants; 
i.e., fame, honour, and the pleasure, for its own sake, of serving others. 
If the moral structure of the society and of its individual participants 
can gradually be brought toward this orientation the whole society will 
be better off, for honour will increasingly replace pay as the most 
sought-after reward, permitting an evener distribution of income 
without loss of productivity; and consumer satisfaction will increase as 
individuals at every level care more about the quality of the work they 
perform. 
Tibor Scitovsky gets at Marshall's closely related concept of 
'activities' by dividing the sources of achievable 'satisfactions' into 
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two sets, comforts and stimuli, where the latter often include activities 
such as work, sports and cultural pastimes. Scitovsky stresses that an 
important source of human satisfaction is the mental stimulation that 
is associated with novelty. This fact, however, creates 'a logical 
difficulty which seems to rule out consumer rationality in the sense in 
which we know and accept it as the governing principle of consumer 
behaviour in other areas of consumer choice.'6 The logical difficulty 
comes from the fact that there are stimuli which include novelty (Or 
surprise) among their satisfying elements and which, at the same time, 
require an 'investment' of time and effort in learning. Why make the 
investment if you do not know what the reward will be? But if you do 
know the reward in advance, you are n,bbed of the element of surprise. 
An example given by Scitovsky is 'the impossible situation of having to 
have musical knowledge to be able rationally to decide whether that 
musical knowledge is worth acquiring. Nor', as he then adds, 'is that 
problem confined to music; it is common to all forms of stimulus 
consumption that require a skill for their enjoyment.' (ibid., p. 124). 
His conclusion is that this paradox is resolved when the previous 
generation, having experienced the rewards to be had from 'education 
in consumption skills', provides such 'humanistic education' for the 
young. 
The characteristic which most separates 'comfort' type experiences 
from 'stimulating' experiences is on the spectrum from familiarity to 
strangeness, or novelty. A little of the latter is exciting; too much is 
nerve-wracking.7 In spite of the varying range of tolerance that 
different people have for the boredom of familiarity or the alarms of 
strangeness, one can, nevertheless, make some useful generalisations 
about the relevance of this point with respect to economic groupings. 
For example, most people tend strongly to prefer working among 
people they know to working among strangers. Employers tend to 
prefer to hire an individual who has some connection, however 
tenuous, with someone they know, rather than a person who is 
completely unknown — even though the information gained from the 
introduction' may have no bearing on qualifications for the job in 
question. 
The economics of consumption, as developed in practice by those 
who produce in order to sell to consumers (and who 'sell' to consumers 
what it is that they produce) may depend most obviously upon being 
able to tickle the desire for novelty; but the economics of production, 
insofar as it relates to relationships among people who are working, 
brings out the neglected importance of the desire for familiarity. 
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VIlE Activities The economics of Alfred Marshall will be a 
particularly useful source for an area of human 
psychology that is notably lacking in the modern neoclassical 
paradigm. Marshall saw humans as rounded beings whose human 
values are of central importance. He saw those values not as fixed, but 
as evolving in response to the environment and, most importantly, 
through the activities of their possessors. And he saw the whole society 
as the responsible locus both for the value-shaping environment and 
for the opportunities for individually value-shaping activities. 
Marshall's emphasis upon studying productive activities not only in 
terms of their contribution to consumption, but also as forces for 
societal, cultural and ultimately economic change, is dramatically 
different from what is to be found in neoclassical economics. The latter, 
stressing individual wants and their satisfaction, makes no pretence of 
attempting to recognise social or cultural change aside from the level at 
which existing wants are satisfied. The strongly Utilitarian character 
which continues to provide the ethical/philosophical framework for 
neoclassical economics casts activities as instrumental. The process is 
regarded as relatively unimportant (another way of avoiding a dynamic 
issue), while the emphasis is upon what one gets at the end of the 
process. What one gets can be fairly easily fitted into a static system. 
What one does — the activities themselves — the process again, as 
distinct from the goal — is a dynamic reality deserving of study within a 
theory which would, however, need to be quite different from 
neoclassical economics. 
A social economics with a practical and sustained emphasis upon the 
values of Man as worker — not just after-hours, but the worker on the 
job — will have an additional advantage in possessing a special line to 
the findings of adjacent fields (sociology, psychology, etc.), and a 
special way of using these insights to organise economic concepts and 
data. It will also have a point of view sufficiently distinct from the point 
of view of neoclassical economics as to help clarify the existence and 
the nature of the latter's point of view. 
In this connection, the logical structure of the earlier exercise in goal- 
definition may be made somewhat clearer. The primary goal, welfare, 
analysed in terms of four aspects (survival, happiness, self-actualisation 
and moral or spiritual development), is to be understood as referring to 
states of being. As such, this is at some remove from the subjects with 
which economics can be expected to grapple directly; yet it is critical to 
keep the 'being' goals in mind to assist in prioritising and balancing the 
secondary goals. 
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The secondary goals may be roughly categorised under two 
headings: shaving' and 'doing'. 
— Consumption and sustainability are mostly about having. 
— Education and work, as examples of enhancing activities, may be 
ends in themselves, and then they are importantly concerned with 
doing; but under some circumstances they are perceived as more 
relevantly means to the ends of having. 
— Hope has been strongly attached to the materialistic definition of 
progress with respect to consumption in the last two hundred 
years; but resource constraints may require that, if this is to remain 
a goal, it will have to be experienced increasingly with respect to 
the doing aspects of life. 
— Economic justice continues, and probably will continue for a long 
time, to be most concerned with who gets what (shaving'). 
Normally related to this, of course, is the critical importance of 
the question of who may participate in what activity. This may, in 
turn, be closely linked with issues of self-esteem as well as pleasure 
in life. There are not a few people for whom these last-mentioned 
issues are the chief motivation to press for equal access to 
work and educational opportunities; but for many others the 
critical issue is a survival level of consumption, for themselves and 
for their children. 
VIII Human Statistical smoothing, as an effect of aggrega- 
groupings and tion, can sometimes cause realistic results to be 
interactions deduced from unrealistic assumptions. An 
example is the assumption of maximisation of 
VIllA Issues of self-interest. At times this may be unusefully 
aggregation unrealistic, but it should be stressed that there 
are many other places where it works very well, 
precisely because, in the aggregate, human behaviour may average out 
to a pattern which is consistent with the core neoclassical assumptions 
— even though those assumptions would not be an accurate description 
of the underlying individual choices. 
However, the problems which can arise out of the initial simplifying 
assumptions may also be compounded by the interdependencies and 
other types of interrelationships which occur in aggregations, but 
which tend to be ignored in neoclassical models. 
For example, neoclassical economics cannot well accommodate to its 
areas of real strength explanations or predictions which take into 
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account the way work groups behave differently from what would be 
predicted as a simple sum of the parts (e.g., instances of compensation 
for the weakness of a member who does not produce as effectively as 
the rest). There is much relevant group economic behaviour wherein an 
incentive which would produce a given effect upon most of the 
members individually will have a different effect in the context of group 
dynamics. Leadership may play a special role here; also concern for 
how one is perceived by other people; and a variety of other motives 
and interactions, some of which may be subsumed under the term, 
group solidarity. 
In addition to sorting out the variety of incentives which may go 
beyond narrowly construed self-interest, it is also important to note 
that incentives may have different impacts, depending upon whether 
they are felt by individuals, groups of individuals, firms, groups of 
firms (e.g., by sector), by ethnic or interest groups, regions, nations, etc. 
'Social systems differ in the relative mix of the different classes (private, 
collective, sectoral, spatial) of incentives. Incentives interact and the 
system outcome depends upon such outcomes. In some societies the 
incentive mix may promote a high incidence of competitive behavior 
among the institutions; in others, dominant bureaucratic behavior; in 
still others, cooperative behavior, etc.'8 
VIJIB Institutions, The term 'institution' is sufficiently broad9 so 
including that it can be employed to cover most, if not all, 
governments of the human groupings wherein additional 
sophistication is needed to explain economic 
behaviour. To answer this need social economists might go to the field 
of sociology; or they might draw on digests of sociological under- 
standings such as institutionalist economists have sometimes made. 
Again, an evolving, standard literature may develop for this area. 
Over the years a number of first-rate sociologists have been 
individuals who started their educational careers in economics 
(Talcott Parsons is just one example), then discovered that economics 
was not dealing with the questions that had driven them to the field, 
and so moved over to sociology. We need to reverse this drift — to 
attract into social economics individuals with a strong background in 
sociology, who can bring with them an ability to see societies as 
networks of relationships 
— among individuals, creating institutions; and 
among institutions as well. 
Obviously, not all relationships can be studied at once, and the 
defining feature of the field of economics is its focus upon things that 
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have an economic meaning. The point to be made here is that 
institutions, governments and networks of relationships must be 
understood within a more comprehensive context than that tradition- 
ally accorded them in the neoclassical system if we are accurately to 
perceive which of their aspects do, indeed, have the most significant 
economic meaning. The challenge for social economics is to view whole 
economic systems — on local, national and transnational levels — as 
wholes; and to see the integral part played by all institutions, including 
governments, within the systems at each of these levels. 
The role of governments is one of the most important of economic 
topics, and one of the least well addressed. The subject is equally an 
embarrassment to Marxian economics, where the expectation was 
stated by Marx that, if everything else was done right, governments 
would simply wither away; and to neoclassical economics, where, too, 
the decision to call on government implies a kind of failure ('market 
failure', in this case). 
Among the institutional issues which will require special attention 
from social economists, two of the most important are power and 
competition. Economic and non-economic power which can be used to 
reduce economic competition is one among many anti-competitive 
forces to be found in human nature and in the nature of institutions. 
If, as suggested earlier (in Chapter 1), idealisations of competition 
and cooperation occur in the neoclassical and the Marxian paradigms 
as simplifying assumptions which are, however, inadequate to handle 
some real world complexities — so, too, is another alternative, coercion, 
inadequately recognised by both systems. In the neoclassical system 
coercion, as a power relation, is only considered in relation to the 
activities of government. Relations in society are assumed to be divided 
up in such a way that free choices about production and allocation 
always and only occur in the economic (market) realm; while coerced 
choices, determined by power relations, are seen as exclusively political 
(governmental). In fact, government is an important actor in the 
production and allocation of public goods and services; and coercive, 
power relations are to be found at many points in the economic sphere. 
Power relations affect, e.g., the purchase and sale of labour power, as 
well as transactions between large and small firms, etc. 
For different reasons, coercion in relation to economic matters is 
also insufficiently analysed in the Marxian system. The diversity of 
kinds and sources of power in the economic sphere is hard to see in a 
system which relegates all power to a class source. Moreover, 
communist economics are ultimately concerned with the ideal world 
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when political and economic coercion will have ceased to exist. In the 
meantime, the coercion of the state one of the outstanding features of 
life in a communist system is handled with kid gloves, if at all. 
Disaggregation will be important for the social economics approach 
to institutions. While there are useful things to be learned from finding 
the similarities between such institutions as families and firms, firms 
and governments, etc., there are also important differences to be noted. 
The neoclassical paradigm has tended to use the firm as the typical 
institution, and has made significant progress in some areas by seeing 
how far the theory of the firm can then be made to apply to other 
institutions. There are, however, important areas where maximisation 
of a single function (by analogy with profit maximisation) is not the 
most useful assumption to impose upon institutional behaviour. 
There is a logical chain to be observed between (a) the purposes for 
which institutions exist; (b) their actions; (c) policy advice to support 
those actions; and (d) the theory on which that policy advice is based. 
Though goals (purposes) and theory are at opposite ends of this chain, 
they remain importantly linked; the emphasis of theory needs to be 
affected by the goals, just as much as the realism of the goals should be 
affected by the theory. 
A concrete example of what is meant here would be the analysis of 
such public institutions as national governments, or the World Bank. 
Some recent work in public choice theory has emphasised the positive 
observation that individuals in these institutions are often motivated by 
private self-interest, and may be understood from the assumption of 
selfishness which is sometimes used as the micro basis for the theory of 
the firm.'° Such positive observations on the nature of actual human 
motivations are obviously of great importance, to be discussed and 
debated without inhibitions stemming from preferences as to the way 
the world be. At the same time, social economists who operate 
near the the chain would be expected to 
accept some responsibility for knowing the broad goals of the 
institutions and for reflecting on the relationship of theory and advice 
vis-d-vis those broad goals, as well as with respect to the narrower tasks 
for which they might have been called in. 
For instance, if a social economist has been called upon to advise a 
government on which ones, among a variety of available new 
technologies, should be promoted as most efficient in carrying out 
some agricultural task, s/he would not only answer the question that 
was asked, about economic efficiency, but would also comment upon 
whether the technology which promised the most output for the least 
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investment would also have important impacts upon employment or 
other elements of the broader welfare to which the government is, 
presumably, committed. 
IX Economic A distinction needs to be made between a system of 
systems economic theory, as a set of abstractions about the 
perceived world, and an economic system, as the 
actual structure of some grouping of real world economic activities. 
The system of neoclassical economic theory has co-evolved along 
with capitalist economic systems; it is best adapted to explaining 
capitalist economies, and to assisting in achievement of the capitalist 
goal of maximising a society's total consumption opportunities 
through efficiency in production. 
The system of Marxian economic theory evolved on a path that took 
about seventy years before converging with a real communist economic 
system, but it is nevertheless designed to aid in understanding 
communist economies, and to promote their objectives of fair 
distribution of work and consumption. 
With what system' shall we associate system of social 
economic theory'? That question can be answered in two ways. 
First, we may note that the capitalist system described by 
neoclassical theory does not, in fact, exist; any more than the 
communist society described by Marxian theory is to be found 
anywhere in the real world. Both systems of theory describe ideal 
economic systems: one of perfect competition, the other of perfect 
fairness and cooperation. Social economics, rooted in the period when 
the evolving field of economics was dominated by Alfred Marshall (see 
Chapter 5, below), is more directly related to neoclassical than to 
Marxian economics; we could begin to understand its place in the 
world of actual economic systems by saying that it will attempt to 
describe some aspects of economic life in so-called capitalist countries 
with more accuracy and relevance than the neoclassical paradigm can 
do. If it is successful in this goal, it may then also be of use to 
historically Marxist or socialist countries, as they, too, seek for an 
alternative way of organising their understanding of changing 
economic realities. 
The other way of addressing this question is to note that we are 
living in a time of great transitions, where what have for two centuries 
been analysed as national economies are now often better 
comprehended as parts of a global economy — but the latter has yet 
to be fully analysed or understood. Rules and realities are changing; 
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issues that had not previously seemed important enough to be included 
in our accounting are now emerging as critical elements of our 
economies; and goals, too, may be changing. In many ways humanity is 
at present more affluent than ever before; that very affluence arouses 
demands for the subordination of the goal of productive efficiency to 
the goals of economic and social justice. At the same time the costs, to 
a rapidly approaching future, of production and consumption are 
being discovered to be much higher than previously imagined. 
Something like social economics is needed, not only as an alternative 
to the neoclassical economic explanation of capitalism, but to promote 
clear thinking, in an increasingly globalised world, about alternatives 
to both capitalism and communism — neither of which, in any case, 
really exists as described by neoclassical or Marxian economics. 
IXA Macro Some elements of macro theory are so loosely or 
and global uncomfortably connected to the core of neoclassi- 
economics cal theory that they may be regarded as lying 
outside of the neoclassical pool of light; fair game, 
in fact, for any other system that can do a better job of incorporating 
them. 
As suggested earlier, the macro elements which do fit into the 
neoclassical core are, generally, those areas: 
— where the aggregation of micro elements can be simply made, 
because the theory of the atomistic cases is applicable to the 
aggregation thereof; and 
— where social welfare may be achieved by maximisation of 
individual welfare. 
Trade is an example of where neoclassical economics usefully, but in 
disregard of some aspects of its own theoretical consistency, employs 
aggregate concepts as though they resulted from a simple addition of 
atomistic units. Neoclassical economists often present their argument 
as though they were 'building up' from a one person, one good 
economy. This procedure is, in fact, a logical impossibility in light of 
the phase-shift that occurs when people and goods are aggregated so as 
to permit trade; one of the most important outcomes of the neoclassical 
system is, indeed, the welfare-raising effect of trade, which could not be 
predicted from knowledge of all the actors individually, disregarding 
interactions among them. 
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With this said, and accepting some theoretical inconsistency, the 
neoclassical system nevertheless possesses powerful tools for explaining 
certain aspects of international trade. Other aspects remain relatively 
less understood. 
As an example both of some neoclassical strengths and of some of its 
weaknesses, we might consider the global grain trade. We can find here 
many of the ideal conditions listed in the overall description of the 
neoclassical core areas: there are relatively complete markets which 
tend to be capitalistic; many of the conditions for perfect competition 
(e.g., homogeneous products, many final buyers and sellers) are 
present; and there are such an enormous number of actors (including a 
majority of the people in the world, one way or another) that at least 
some local 'irrationalities' get lost in the averaging out of behaviour. 
Neoclassical analysis has, therefore, a basis on which to build demand- 
supply diagrams that are quite realistic. However, this approach loses 
its grip, for example: 
— where attention has to be paid to how the aggregate groups of 
actors are defined (a nation? a farmers' lobby in the EEC? a 
multinational trading company? a trading bloc?); 
— where power transcends the neoclassical list of market forces 
(military or political as well as economic power; or even the power 
of world opinion or of prevailing fashions in ideas); or 
— where tastes change. For example, the preference for meat is 
sometimes as relevant as the ability to pay the premium for it. Also 
cf. the growing taste for wheat (promoted in part by the US policy 
of PL480 exports of surplus grain at below-market prices) in areas 
of the world not well equipped to grow it. 
In such areas as these, where neoclassical economists have been most 
effective in understanding the global grain trade it is often because they 
have, on their own, ventured outside the neoclassical system of theory. 
More generally, the issues of aggregation which we have seen both 
helping and hurting the effectiveness of neoclassical theory are critical 
of its welfare predictions and prescriptions. It gradually came to be 
recognised, during the time that Alfred Marshall dominated economic 
theorising, that the letter of the Utilitarian philosophy could not be 
followed, for it was impossible to sum up individual utilities for 
anything like Bentham's 'felicific calculus'. However, nothing has really 
replaced the concept of maximisation of non-interactive, individual 
utility sums as a way of linking together neoclassical micro-economics 
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with its macro aspirations to address social welfare. One problem, 
which social economics must be designed specifically to avoid, has been 
the over-balancing of the neoclassical system of theory towards a micro 
grounding. In spite of the rejection of Utilitarian summing just cited, 
neoclassical theory has continued, in most respects, to proceed as if 
human aggregations were in no way different from the sum of the 
parts. Given this bias, it is probably the case that the neoclassical! 
Utilitarian approach has the greatest likelihood of contributing to 
social welfare when it is applied to highly homogeneous societies. 
When neoclassical economics is applied to a society with important 
heterogeneities, it can still appear to work if there is a homogeneous 
group which is sufficiently dominant so that what applies to that group 
appears to apply to the whole society. Dissenting voices have been 
raised in Western societies by various groups, including women, who 
have argued that there has existed an unrecognised division between 
the most generalised interests of men in these societies, and those of 
women; and representative of the poor, who have said that their 
interests, too, differed from those of the dominant group. From such 
points of view, the most damning criticism which can be made of the 
neoclassical system of economic theory is that it has often operated like 
the theory of the status quo; the theory of the group in power; 
'privileged' or 'macho' economics. 
Macro economics, as it now exists in the neoclassical system, is a 
theory addressed to the interests of nation states. It is generally 
accepted that the goal of macroeconomics (its 'definition of success', as 
this term will be described in Chapter 9, below) is to maximise the 
welfare (usually interpreted as the GNP) of a given nation, which 
includes attempting to improve the competitive position of each nation 
with respect to other nations. For an economist who is an adviser to a 
particular national government, this is often the appropriate position 
to assume. 
However, 'micro' and 'national' are not the only levels of economic 
interest. Very different understandings will emerge from a recognition 
of the place, the goals, and the powers of other relevant actors on 
all levels. To name just a few of those that should be taken into 
account: 
— there are cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Bonn or Mexico 
City, that deal directly with foreign and multinational entities, 
bypassing their own national governments in important, 
recognised ways 
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— there is the United Nations, with its agencies; also the 
International Labor Organisation 
— there are research networks, such as the CGIAR system which has 
created, supported and disseminated the Green Revolution 
— there are multilateral agencies such as the ones formed at Bretton 
Woods 
— NGOs such as OXFAM, Amnesty International, or International 
Physicians Against Nuclear War 
— international professional organisations, such as those to which 
physicists, psychiatrists, or archaeologists the world over feel 
allegiance 
— multilateral corporations, such as the giant agribusinesses, or 
firms in microprocessing, telecommunications or automobile 
production 
— international crime syndicates, such as the drug cartels 
— internatiuonal accords and agreements such as the Montreal 
Protocol to limit emissions of chloroflurocarbons 
— and there are abstractions demanding allegiance, such as the 
Sullivan Principles. 
All of these examples illustrate the forces which go under, or over, or 
around, or through, the force-field of the nation states." In addition to 
their social and political ramifications, they have important economic 
impacts. Recognition and understanding of these impacts requires a 
'global economics' that does not at present exist: neither market 
analysis nor distinctions of class are sufficient to define the relevant 
actors on the modern world scene. 
Returning to the area that has traditionally been defined as 'macro' 
economics — the area of the nation and its concerns — there remain 
important areas for exploration which also require some different 
approaches. Neoclassical economics has not come to terms with the 
fact that, even in 'capitalist' countries, the private sector is only one of 
four: the other three being the government, the not-for-profit, and the 
non-monetised sectors. Models based upon the assumption of profit- 
seeking fit poorly when applied to these last three sectors. They go a 
long way to explaining the allocation of resources within the first 
sector, but not within the second, third and fourth; and they leave 
much to be explained regarding the allocation of resources among the 
sectors (one of the most critical issues for a modern economy). Finally, 
if profit-maximisation is not sufficient, what definitions of success shall 
be sought for each sector? 
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IXB A third Karl Marx predicted that the defects in capitalist 
alternative, systems would lead to their collapse. With a few 
system and different twists of history he could have been 
theory proved right: the evils of the first century of 
capitalism after the Industrial Revolution might 
well, had they continued on their path, have led to violent political 
revolution. There was increasing consciousness and resentment of such 
social ills as great concentrations of power in the hands of property 
owners; cruel practices (often virtually necessitated by the system, 
regardless of the wishes of individual employers) in the employment of 
relatively powerless individuals, especially women and children; the 
virtual abandonment of those unable to support themselves in the 
market system (orphans, the old or disabled, others who could not find 
employment); neglect of such public goods as health care or rural 
transportation; and increasingly violent economic swings, the 'boom 
and bust' cycles. However, the most critical of these defects were 
corrected by what J.K. Galbraith has called the 'Bismarck/Lloyd- 
George/Roosevelt revolution','2 whereby systems of social security, old 
age pensions, and unemployment insurance, along with agricultural 
price supports and the progressive income tax,'3 irrevocably altered the 
nature of capitalism. It ceased to have both the ideal character of 
perfect competition and free markets portrayed in neoclassical 
economics, and the perfidious character of absolute exploiter 
portrayed in Marxian polemics. 
As the end of the twentieth century arrives, communist countries are 
making decisions which amount to an admission of failure in their 
economic systems; the degree to which they have achieved their goals 
of equity in allocation of work and consumption seems insufficient 
compensation for the loss of efficiency in production. This may make it 
easier for capitalist countries, and the economists therein, to examine 
the weaknesses, even while they continue to build upon the strengths, 
of the socio/poiitical/economic compromises which constitute modern 
capitalist systems. Some of the requirements for a new, co-evolving 
economic system and system-of-economic-theory relate to the 
following points: 
— Change and development will continue to be critical realities and 
needs in all parts of the world not only the developing countries — 
for the foreseeable future. We need a system of economic theory 
which can perceive, analyse, and, where desirable, give assistance 
to a variety of sources for change and development. For instance: 
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• up' and down' approaches, and ways of 
combining those two 
• NGOs and multilateral organisations of many kinds 
• cultural, religious and/or ethical impulses 
• centre-periphery relations 
• domestic unrest . foreign inputs 
• migration • markets 
• planning • technology 
• education • basic needs 
all of these need to be understood as forces which, for good or 
ill, may initiate, channel, structure, or block change and 
development. 
— Profit-maximisation rears its head even in communist societies. If it 
were the ubiquitous force supposed in capitalist societies, 
neoclassical economics would have smooth sailing in its 
predictions, descriptions and prescriptions for the socialist as well 
as the market-oriented parts of the world. In fact, profit- 
maximising is an important, but not the sole important, 
motivation; and we need to be able to make use of and 
encourage, as well as simply to recognise, other impulses and 
goals that motivate human beings as economic actors. 
— The systems of farm supports which are the rule, not the exception, 
in industrialised countries, make what has been held up as the 
classic textbook example of the conditions for perfect competition 
into a state-regulated industry, with effects on national and 
international markets and prices which threaten increasingly to 
outweigh the humanitarian claims for protection of the (mostly 
large) farmers. 
At the same time, from the global perspective, stabilised high 
prices in one or a few major producing nations may be used (as 
they were during the late 1970s in the USA) to create gAobal grain 
stockpiling against times of poor harvest; this is the other side of 
the coin to the EEC's 'mountains of butter' etc. that have offended 
the sensibilities of those in favour of free trade and cheap food. It is 
not clear that completely unfettered agricultural markets are the 
best mechanism to serve global needs and maximise global welfare 
in face of the uncertainties of the long as well as the short run. 
— Neither the play of market forces nor government interventions 
have yet shown the way to solve what emerges as the single largest 
economic problem of modern times: how to make markets and 
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institutions (especially bureaucracies) responsive to broader 
conceptions of welfare than narrow, short-run self-interest. 
Human societies are becoming increasingly global societies in 
which we find that are all poisoning our neighbour's well, and 
we are all drinking our neighbour's water'. If the reality were as 
simple as that metaphor, simple pricing mechanisms would solve 
our problems. In the astonishingly complex world of ever greater 
globalisation, a value system (undergirded by appropriately 
redesigned macro and global accounting systems) which assumes 
a primary importance for the future of the whole human race is the 
most efficient way to internalise the intertwined, boundary- 
ignoring chains of causes and effects. 
— In a world where resource constraints will take on a newly 
compelling force and urgency, we need to think differently about 
the relationship between consumption and welfare, and between 
work and welfare. Production needs to be designed, on the one 
hand, to allow reduced throughput of the factors (see section 
VIB in Chapter 3, above). On the other hand, if some types of 
production are thereby limited, the goal must be for other iii' 
(information intensive) work and leisure, things and activities, to 
make up for that kss. 
— We need a system of economic theory that can deal directly with 
economic issues that are not all market issues. Problems do not 
necessarily leave the sphere of economics when they do not have 
good market solutions. Economists must be able to address the 
issue of balance between markets and other forces: governments, 
bureaucracies, and the third and fourth sectors — the not-for-profit 
and the non-monetised (or domestic) spheres of action. 
— We need, finally, a system of economic theory which can deal 
overtly with the multiplicity of irrepressible but not always 
compatible welfare goals that have been left to the unconscious 
or unadmitted corners of existing theories. We have to have ways 
of formally recognising the desirability of dispersion of power and 
enhanced equality of access to the means and the results of 
production, for example via democratic institutions and general 
education, as well as via effective markets. 
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Notes 
For the non-economist, marginal analysis is concerned with decisions 
taken on the knife-point of yes-or-no, when the decision-maker is hard 
put to it to decide, e.g., Shall I buy this9 Shall I employ another worker9 
Shall I work another hour? Inframarginal motivations are the ones that 
are made before the worker is ready to decide about his/her last hour of 
work, or the consumer his/her last item of purchase, etc. 
See also Section VIIC, below. 
2 Amartya Sen, 'Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations 
of Economic Theory', in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 6, 1977: 
pp. 317—44. 
3. Which are probably best understood as instrumental choices — see below. 
Choice is more readily understood in the context of instrumental than of 
expressive behaviour. 
4. Talbot Page, 'Intergenerational Justice as Opportunity' in Douglas 
MacLean and Peter Brown (eds) Energy and the Future (Rowman and 
Littlefield, New Jersey, 1982) p. 45. 
5. Cf. A. Marshall, 'The Old Generation of Economists and the New' (1987) 
in Memorials, esp. pp. 302—3. Cf. also a comment by Albert Hirschman: 
men and women have the ability to step back from their 'revealed' 
wants, volitions, and preferences, to ask themselves whether they really 
want these wants and prefer these preferences, and consequently to 
form metapreferences that may differ from their preferences . . . . the 
concept of metapreference must be of concern to the economist, to the 
extent that he claims an interest in understanding processes of 
economic change. 
When a change in preferences has been preceded by the formation of 
a metapreference . . . it typically represents a change in values rather 
than a change in tastes Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of 
Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse, AER, 74, 
nos 1—2, 1984; pp. 89—90. Italics in the original.) 
See also Paul Streeten's Appendix ('Recent Controversies') to Gunnar 
Myrdal's The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory 
(International Library of Sociology, London, 1953) esp. p. 215. 
6. Tibor Scitovsky, Changing Consumer Tastes Save Resources9', 
essay written in 1979, repr. in Human Desires and Economic Satisfaction: 
Essays on the Frontiers of Economics (Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1986) p. 123. 
7. See Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy (Oxford University Press, 
1976). 
8. T. R. Lakshmanan, 'Knowledge Technologies and the Evolution of the 
Economic Landscape', paper presented at the International Workshop on 
Technical Change at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, 
Boston University; 11-12 October 1988, p. 13. 
9. It is also a word which is rather clumsy to use. For example, 'institution' 
may refer to the idea of a firm, and to 'this particular firm'; it may refer to 
the idea of marriage, but not to 'this particular marriage'. It is generally 
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used, in the social sciences, to mean something quite abstract, e.g.. 
patterns of practice around which expectations converge' 
(0. R. Young, international Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', 
in World Politics, 32, 1980); but in common speech it is probably most 
often used with reference to something thought of as a building — a jail, or 
a mental hospital, within which inmates are These 
semantic difficulties have likely been a factor in the lack of cohesion of the 
school in economics. 
10. This matter is, in fact, a little more complicated, as the most elegant firm 
theories assume profit-maximising as the only motive; and that is not 
necessarily a selfish one, as it requires the agents' motives to be identical 
with those of the principals. 
11. For more discussion of these to sovereignty' see the 
forthcoming special issue of World Development, Global Commons: Site 
of Danger, Source of Hope, N. Goodwin (ed.), to appear in early 1991. 
12. From a lecture by John Kenneth Galbraith at the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, 5 April 1987. The historical sketch presented in this 
paragraph draws upon his selection of details. 
13. As Arthur Okun has commented, their ten-point radical program of 
the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels put [the progressive income 
tax] in second place — behind only the abolition of private land ownership. 
Yet, by 1913, that means had become law through a constitutional 
amendment in this bastion of free enterprise [the USAI' (Equality and 
Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, The Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 101). 
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